

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 015849

P R 091457Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1676

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION BERLIN

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 05727

EXDIS

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, UR, US, EEC, GW

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SUBJECT: WESTERN INSTABILITY AND EAST/WEST DETENTE:

VIEWS OF SENIOR FONOFF OFFICIALS

REF: BONN 5429 (NOTAL)

BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE VIEW OF SENIOR FONOFF OFFICIALS, WESTERN INSTABILITY AND SOVIET BITTERNESS OVER THE COURSE OF EVENTS FOLLOWING THE MIDEAST WAR MAY HAVE CONVINCED MOSCOW TO SLOW DOWN THE PACE OF SALT AND MBFR AND LED THE KREMLIN TO RESHAPE ITS WESTERN POLICY ALONG HARDER LINES. THEY ARE URGING THE US TO THROW ITS WEIGHT INTO THE FINAL NEGOTIATION PHASE OF CSCE. THE GERMANS BELIEVE A FIRM U.S. POSTURE IS ESSENTIAL IN FINAL CSCE STAGES TO OBTAIN DECENT RESULTS. END SUMMARY

1. DURING SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS APRIL 2-3 WITH VISITING ACDA COUNSELOR NEWHOUSE, POLICY PLANNING STAFF CHIEF BRUNNER, FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH AND FONOFF MBFR DEPT CHIEF RUTH COMMENTED ON PROSPECTS FOR EAST-WEST DETENTE IN VIEW OF CURRENT WESTERN INSTABILITY. BRUNNER, WHO ALSO SERVES AS CHIEF OF THE GERMAN CSCE DEL, BEGAN BY RECALLING THE CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE POOR STATE OF ATLANTIC RELATIONS, THE FURTHER UNCERTAINTY AND INSTABILITY INJECTED INTO THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SCENE BY THE PASSING OF POMPIDOU AND THE "ANTI-EUROPEAN" MINORITY LABOR GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN, AND THE GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY IN ITALY AND BELGIUM.

2. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND GIVEN MOSCOW'S SEEMING BITTERNESS OVER POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDEAST, BRUNNER VOICED CONCERN THAT SOME SOVIET LEADERS MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO RESHAPE POLICY ON HARDER LINES. BRUNNER BELIEVES SOME SOVIET LEADERS MAY BE ARGUING THAT MOSCOW HAS GONE TOO FAR IN ACKNOWLEDGING THE EC AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN WORLD AFFAIRS AND IGNORED SOME OF THE CENTRIFUGAL TENDENCIES WITHIN NATO.

3. BRUNNER AND ROTH CONSIDERED IT LIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD, IN THIS SITUATION, SLOW DOWN THE PACE OF SALT AND MBFR WHILE DRIVING FORWARD TO EXPLOIT WESTERN

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WEAKNESS AND INSTABILITY DURING THE FINAL NEGOTIATING PHASE OF CSCE. BRUNNER THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WELL CONTENTED WITH WESTERN PROBLEMS AND WOULD ALSO, FOR POLITICAL, MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL REASONS MORE DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH SALT AND MBFR, BE INCLINED TO LET THE U.S. AND ITS OTHER ALLIES COME TO MOSCOW AS DEMANDEUR IN THESE TWO NEGOTIATIONS.

4. RUTH SAID HE BELIEVED SOVIET WESTERN POLICY HAD A DUAL PURPOSE, ONE PART AIMED AT INTERFERING WITH AND PROMOTING POLITICAL DOMINANCE OVER WESTERN EUROPE, BUT ALSO SEEKING VIA SALT AND MBFR TO LIMIT THE DANGER OF CRISIS SITUATIONS BY ENCOURAGING GREATER MILITARY STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

5. ROTH THOUGHT MOSCOW WOULD STIFFEN ITS LINE ON SALT. GIVEN THE CURRENTLY DECLINING PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION AND THE PRIORITY SOVIET MBFR OBJECTIVE OF BLOCKING SUCH COOPERATION WITHIN NATO, ROTH

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

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P R 091457Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1677

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

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USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 05727

EXDIS

THOUGHT THE SOVIETS MIGHT, DESPITE SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY AT APRIL 1 INFORMAL SESSION (VIENNA 2913), SLOW THE PACE OF MBFR AND ADOPT OBDURATE POSITIONS ON REDUCTIONS OF AND SUBCEILING FOR BUNDESWEHR. IN SUM,ROTHEXPECTED A SOVIET POLICY OF "STANDSTILL" ON MBFR AND SALT IN THE COMING MONTHS.

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6. REGARDING CSCE, BRUNNER ASKED THAT THE U.S. THROW ITS FULL WEIGHT INTO THE FINAL NEGOTIATING PHASE OF CSCE. BRUNNER CONTENDED THAT THIS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL IF THE CSCE WAS TO PRODUCE "DECENT RESULTS". IN BRUNNER'S VIEW, THIS U.S. POSTURE IN CSCE WAS IMPORTANT IN VIEW OF THE OSTENSIBLE SOVIET DRAWING BACK FROM COMMITMENTS, IN JUNE 1973 SALT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND MBFR JOINT COMMUNIQUE, TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS ON SALT AND MBFR. WHILE REJECTING ANY LINKAGES, IN REFERRING TO CSCE, BRUNNER STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THAT EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE VIEWED COMPREHENSIVELY. BRUNNER THOUGHT IT NOW UP TO THE SOVIETS TO MOVE AFTER THE EASTER BREAK ON CBM'S, GIVEN AGREEMENT IN GENEVA ON INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS. BRUNNER SAID HE EXPECTED CSCE THIRD STAGE WOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE SUMMIT, ADDING THAT BRANDT WOULD NOT REFUSE TO ATTEND IF THERE WERE DECENT RESULTS.

7. BESIDES SPECIFIC CSCE ISSUES, BOTH BRUNNER AND ROTH SPECULATED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE SHAPE OF THE NEW EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP WHICH COULD ENSUE IN THE CSCE AFTERMATH. BRUNNER AND ROTH TERMED CSCE AND SUBSEQUENT EAST-WEST DIPLOMACY A DYNAMIC PROCESS IN WHICH THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE WOULD REMAIN THE OVERALL POLITICAL DOMINATION OF WESTERN EUROPE. BRUNNER SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE U.S. TO ADOPT A STRONG STANCE IN EUROPE AND NOT LEAVE IT TO THE WEAKENED EC-9 TO COUNTER BALANCE THE SOVIET POLITICO-MILITARY POWER. A SAFE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER IN THE SEVENTIES AND BEYOND REQUIRED THAT THE U.S. PLAY A FULL ROLE IN THE EAST-WEST MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY INITIATED IN CSCE.
HILLENBRAND

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, WAR, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION, POLITICAL SITUATION, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 APR 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974BONN05727
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740080-1136
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740456/aaaabzdo.tel
Line Count: 221
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: BONN 5429 (NOTAL)
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <06 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: WESTERN INSTABILITY AND EAST/WEST DETENTE: VIEWS OF SENIOR FONOFF OFFICIALS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US, GE, XF, NATO, EEC, CSCE, SALT TALKS, MBFR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005